Introduction
Many proponents of computationalism, Hauser and Pat Hayes. David Chalmers provided helpful analysis of a previous draft, and I pro ted from reading his The Conscious Mind, wherein zombies are taken to be logically possible. Conversations with Ned Block and Bill Rapaport also proved to be valuable. 1 Sometimes also called`Strong Arti cial Intelligence' (Russell & Norvig: 51] ), or`GO-FAI' (Haugeland: 37] ), or`the computational conception of mind' (Glymour: 34] , etc.
Dennett, the person-to-be is the robot cog, or a descendant thereof, a being taking shape with Dennett's help at MIT. 2 I have advanced a number of arguments designed to establish that the \person building project" will inevitably fail, but that it will manage to produce artifacts capable of excelling in the famous Turing Test, and in its more stringent relatives. 3 What sort of artifacts will these creatures be? I o er an un attering one-word response:
Pollock, Dennett, and like-minded researchers are busy building : : : zombies. 4 Is it really possible that what Pollock and Dennett and other computationalists are building is a creature whose overt behavior is as sophisticated as ours, but whose inner life is as empty as a rock's? I believe so. I also believe | for reasons to be speci ed below | that the mere possibility of zombies is enough to explode the computational conception of mind.
A recent clash between Daniel Dennett and John Searle over zombies provides a tailor-made springboard to a sustained defense of the zombie attack against computationalism. Dennett, more than any other thinker, says that no philosopher of mind has anything to fear from zombies; in fact, he thinks that those philosophers who seriously ponder zombies (and Blockheads, Twin Earthlings, and Swampmen) have \lost their grip on reality " 22] . Searle, on the other hand, believes that zombies threaten at least behavioral conceptions of mentality. In this paper I try to show that Searle is right, and that he has laid the foundation for a new, rigorous attack on computationalism | the zombie attack. If this attack is sound, it will follow not only that aspiring person builders will fail, but that in failing they may indeed give us zombies. 5 This paper is structured as follows. In section 1 I focus the Dennett- 2 Dennett shares his vision in 24]. 3 The rst wave of my arguments are found in the monograph 14] . A re ned and sustained argument for the view that Pollock, Dennett, and like-minded people will manage to produce non-persons capable of passing the Turing Test and its relatives can be found in 13] . New formal arguments against the person building project can be found in my 8] and 9]. Alan Turing presented his famous test in 59]. Stevan Harnad was the rst to suggest more stringent systematic variants on the original Turing Test; see his 36] . 4 I refer to philosophers' zombies, not those creature who shu e about half-dead in the movies. Actually, the zombies of cinematic fame apparently have real-life correlates created with a mixture of drugs and pre-death burial: see 20] , 19] . 5 When I refer to`person builders' I refer to those who intend to replicate human persons in a computational system. Presumably there are more \biological" ways of striving to build persons | ways involving, e.g., cloning.
Searle clash, and then argue that Searle seems to be the immediate victor. In section 2 I adapt the results of section 1 so as to produce a disproof computationalism. In section 3 I defend this disproof by destroying rebuttals from, and on behalf of, Dennett, including one from his Consciousness Explained which seeks to exploit David Rosenthal's \higher order theory" of consciousness. In section 4 I consider and reject two nal rejoinders, one of which presses the question, \Well then, why aren't we zombies?" I end in section 5 with a brief summary.
Dennett's Dilemma
Dennett is the arch-defender of the computational conception of mind that underlies the \person building project"; Searle, on the other hand, is the arch-attacker | and both relish their roles: Dennett, in a rather harsh review 25] of Searle's recent The Rediscovery of the Mind (= RM 52]), a rms that, from the perspective of Searle and like-minded anti-computationalist thinkers, he is the \enemy," and the \target representative of cognitive] orthodoxy." Searle, as is well known (from his Chinese Room Argument 54]), and well-revealed repeatedly in RM, regards computationalism (and related positions on the mind, e.g., machine functionalism), to be a \stun-ning mistake." 6 Dennett has recently claimed that it is Searle who has made a stunning mistake: his claim is speci cally that Searle's inference from RM's central zombie thought-experiment is obviously awed, and fatally so. But, as we'll soon see, the argument based upon this thought-experiment is not only competent: once formalized, it becomes transparently valid. Moreover, 6 The Dennett-Searle clash has recently reached a new level of ferocity: Dennett claims that Searle is at best an exceedingly forgetful ( 25] , p. 203):
Is it possible that although Searle has at one time or another read all the literature, and understood it at the time, he has actually forgotten the subtle details, and (given his supreme self-con dence) not bothered to check his memory? For instance, has he simply forgotten that what he calls his reductio ad absurdum of my position (81 in (Searle, 1992) ]) is a version of an argument I myself composed and rebutted a dozen years ago? There is evidence of extreme forgetfulness right within the book. For instance... In the next paragraph, speaking about another of Searle's supposed lapses, Dennett says, \But he forgets all this (apparently!) when forty pages later (107 in (RM)]) he sets out to explain the evolutionary advantage of consciousness: : :" ( 25] ).
the Searlean zombie argument can easily withstand Dennett's recent computationalist Consciousness Explained (= CE), 7 the achilles heel of which, interestingly, would appear to be precisely its vulnerability to zombie thoughtexperiments.
These thought-experiments arise from a situation lifted directly out of the toolbox most philosophers of mind, today, carry with them on the job: Your brain starts to deteriorate and the doctors replace it, piecemeal, with silicon chip workalikes, until there is only silicon inside your refurbished cranium. 8 Searle claims that at least three distinct possibilities arise from this gedankenexperiment:
V1 The Smooth-as-Silk Variation: The complete silicon replacement of your eshand-blood brain works like a charm: same mental life, same sensorimotor capacities, etc. V2 The Zombie Variation: \As the silicon is progressively implanted into your dwindling brain, you nd that the area of your conscious experience is shrinking, but that this shows no e ect on your external behavior. You nd, to your total amazement, that you are indeed losing control of your external behavior : : : You have become blind, but] you hear your voice saying in a way that is completely out of your control,`I see a red object in front of me.' : : : We imagine that your conscious experience slowly shrinks to nothing, while your externally observable behavior remains the same" ( 52] , 66-7). V3 The Curare Variation: Your body becomes paralyzed and the doctors, to your horror, give you up for dead. 9 Searle wants to draw a certain conclusion from V2, the zombie variation, and it's this inference which turns Dennett nearly apoplectic. Here's a summary of the moral Searle wants to draw from V2, in his own words: 9 This scenario would seem to resemble a real-life phenomenon: the so-called \Locked-In" Syndrome. See 43] (esp. the fascinating description on pages 24-5) for the medical details.
In V2] we imagined that the mediating relationship between the mind and the behavior patterns was broken. In this case, the silicon chips did not duplicate the causal powers of the brain to produce conscious mental states, they only duplicated certain input-output functions of the brain. The underlying conscious mental life was left out ( 52] , 68).
And here is Dennett's reaction:
But that is only one of the logically possible interpretations of his second variation : : : The other is the crucial one: while you : : : are dying, another consciousness is taking over your body. The speech acts you faintly hear your body uttering are not yours, but they are also not nobody's! : : : I cannot see how Searle could simply have overlooked this gaping loophole in his thought-experiment. But there it is : : : I am ba ed ( 25], 198-9) .
But what exactly does Searle want from V2? He tells us explicitly on page 69 of The Rediscovery of the Mind that he wants to establish via V2 and V3 that a certain trio of propositions is inconsistent. The trio, reproduced verbatim (p. 69):
(1) Brains cause conscious mental phenomena. (2) There is some sort of conceptual or logical connection between conscious mental phenomena and external behavior. (3) The capacity of the brain to cause consciousness is conceptually distinct from its capacity to cause motor behavior. A system could have consciousness without behavior and behavior without consciousness.
We can put things a bit more perspicuously, and put ourselves in position to assess the Dennett-Searle clash, if we represent the three propositions using elementary logical machinery: Bx i x is a brain; Mx i x causes (a full range of) mental phenomena; and Ex i x causes (a full range of) external behavior. Then the trio, with Searle's underlying modal notions brought to the surface, and a denoting the brain of the character in our thoughtexperiments, becomes (1 ) 9x(Bx^Mx) (2 ) 28x((Bx^Mx) ! Ex)^28x((Bx^Ex) ! Mx) (3 ) 3(Ba^Ma^:Ea)^3(Ba^Ea^:Ma)
The set f(1 ), (2 ), (3 )g is provably inconsistent, in garden variety contexts; the proof is trivial, for example, in quanti cational S5 (which I happen to like) and the weaker T. 10 Dennett's objection, however, is that (3 ) doesn't follow from V2. But this is hardly a gaping loophole; the situation is remedied merely by ne-tuning the zombie variation: Let V2 1 denote the one-(moribund)consciousness variation Searle describes, let V2 2 describe the two-consciousness variation Dennett describes (and, for that matter, let V2 3 denote the three-consciousness case, V2 4 the four, ad in nitum). Clearly, 3V2 1 (as Dennett himself concedes in the quote above). And just as clearly this logical possibility implies the second conjunction of (3 ) (and 3V3 1 implies the rst conjunction). Now, Searle's ultimate aim is probably not to show f(1), (2) , (3)g or its formal correlate inconsistent, for reaching this aim, as we have seen, is a matter of some pretty straightforward logic. Rather, Searle aims no doubt to refute the claim that there is a conceptual connection between conscious mentality and behavior, that is, he seeks to demonstrate the truth of (3 ) and the falsity of (2 ) | a result which follows when the inconsistency we have noted is combined with 3V2 1 , 3V3 1 and ((3V2 1^3 V3 1 ) ! (3 )). 11 Hereafter this argument is denoted by`A 1 '.
By this point the reader has doubtless realized that there is an opportunity for careful exegesis before us. In conceding the logical possibility of 10 Systems like T and S5 can be determined by specifying certain rules of inference (which in both cases include the rules of rst-order logic) and axiom-schemata. The key axiom-schema in T is the one known by that name, viz., 2 ! ; the key axiom-schema in S5 is 5: 3 ! 23 . (S5 includes as a theorem the interesting 32 ! 2 , which becomes relevant later in the paper.) In both systems, moving a negation sign through a modal operator changes that operator (from diamond to box, and vice versa) in a manner perfectly analogous to the rule of quanti er negation in rst-order logic. For a succinct presentation of the core ideas behind (propositional) S5 see Chapter 1 of 16] (a book which includes discussion of T and other systems as well). Here is how the proof goes. Proposition (1 ) is super uous. Then, e.g., instantiate appropriately on axiomschema T to get, with (2 ), by modus ponens, 8x((Bx^Mx) ! Ex); instantiate to (Ba^Ma) ! Ea), derive by propositional logic that :((Ba^Ma)^:Ea), rewrite this by the rule known as necessitation to 2:((Ba^Ma)^:Ea), and in turn rewrite this as :3::((Ba^Ma)^:Ea), and then, by double negation, as :3((Ba^Ma)^:Ea), which of course contradicts (3 )'s rst conjunct. 11 Here is part of his explication: 12 12 Block distinguishes between P-consciousness and A-consciousness; the latter concept is characterized as follows: A state is access-conscious (A-conscious) if, in virtue of one's having the state, a representation of its content is (1) inferentially promiscuous, i.e., poised to be used as a premise in reasoning, and (2) poised for rational] control of action and (3) poised for rational control of speech. ( 4], p. 231) As I have explained elsewhere 10], it's plausible to regard certain extant, mundane computational artifacts to be bearers of A-consciousness. For example, theorem provers with natural language generation capability, and perhaps any implemented computer program (and therefore no doubt Pollock's oscar), would seem to qualify. It follows that a zombie would be A-conscious. In 10] I argue that because (to put it mildly here) it is odd to count (say) ordinary laptop computers running run-of-the-mill pascal programs as conscious in So how should we point to P-consciousness? Well, one way is via rough synonyms. As I said, P-consciousness is experience. P-conscious properties are experiential properties. P-conscious states are experiential states, that is, a state is P-conscious if it has experiential properties. The totality of the experiential properties of a state are \what it is like" to have it. Moving from synonyms to examples, we have P-conscious states when we see, hear, smell, taste and have pains. Pconscious properties include the experiential properties of sensations, feelings and perceptions, but I would also include thoughts, wants and emotions. ( 4] , p. 230)
With the notion of P-consciousness in hand, and the \cognition is computation" core of computationalism in mind, it's easy to modify Searle's (1){(3) so as to produce a parallel trio: 13 (1 C ) Persons are material things, viz., their brains (or some proper part of their central nervous systems). (2 C ) There is a conceptual or logical connection between P-consciousness and the structure of, and information ow in, brains: viz., Necessarily, if a person a's brain instantiates a computation c (which must of course be of a particular type) from t i to t k of some Turing Machine (or other equivalent computational system) m, then person a enjoys a stretch of P-consciousness | from t i to t k | which is identical to c. (3 C ) A person's having P-consciousness is conceptually distinct from that person's brain being instantiated by a Turing Machine running through some computation.
Next, we can again employ some simple modal logic to formalize (1 C ){(3 C ) in order to produce an inconsistent trio (1 C ){(3 C ) that serves as a counterpart for (1 ){(3 ). 14 The next move is to adjust V2 1 by adding the stipulation to any sense of the term,`A-consciousness' ought to be supplanted by suitably con gured terms from its Blockian de nition. 13 For a more formal version of (2 C ) see my 7] . 14 I leave the formalization to motivated readers. One way to go is to invoke a sorted calculus with a, a 0 : : : ranging over persons, c, c 0 : : : over computations, s, s 0 : : : over stretches of consciousness, and (t i {t k ), (t i {t k ) 0 : : : over intervals of time. Then if Cxyz is a predicate meaning that x enjoys y over z, (2 C ) would start with 28a8s8(t i ? t k ) Cas(t i ?
the premise behind this thought-experiment that after Smith's brain begins to deteriorate, the doctors replace it, piecemeal, with silicon chip workalikes which perfectly preserve the structure of, and computational ow in, that brain. Call this new thought-experiment V2 1 | the conclusion of which is the denial of (2 C ), the heart of computationalism.
It follows that if Dennett's Dilemma cannot be escaped, (2 C ) is overthrown, which in turn serves to overthrow computationalism itself. 15 I turn now to the task of closing o all possible escapes.
Can Dennett Dodge His Dilemma?
What would Dennett have to say for himself? It may be thought that Dennett need but point out that Searle's (2) claims only that \there is some sort of conceptual or logical connection between conscious mental phenomena and external behavior," where the italics are supplied by Dennett. For Dennett might then appeal to versions of functionalism wherein the link between mind and behavior isn't as strong as that implied by the modal (2 ). For example, one brand of functionalism holds that what makes a mental state a state of a given type is the causal functional role it typically plays within an interconnected network of inputs, outputs and other states of the system. On this view, a given state can be of a speci c type even if it fails to play the role typically played by such states, and even if it fails to result in any appropriately related behavior in the speci c case. So this view provides an instantiation of the phrase`some sort of conceptual connection,' and hence an instantiation of (2), but this instantiation isn't formalizable as (2 ) .
Unfortunately, Dennett would not succeed with such a move, for at least two reasons.
First, Searle would certainly be content to refute traditional brands of functionalism | brands including a modal conditional to the e ect that if an organism o is in a certain compu-causal state s, then o is necessarily the bearer of a certain mental state s m . In connection with this observation, it is important to note that the target of my adaptation of Searle is none other than a speci cation of such a modal conditional: (2 C ). And that such a conditional be taken to capture the heart of computationalism is quite in keeping with the literature (e.g., 38 , which takes computation to re ect the essence of thinking. The idea is that thinking is computing, not that computing can be so con gured as to produce a thing that seems to think but really doesn't (as in a zombie). Here is how Haugeland puts it:
What are minds? What is thinking? What sets people apart, in all the known universe? Such questions have tantalized philosophers for millennia, but... scant progress could be claimed... until recently. For the current generation has seen a sudden and brilliant owering in the philosophy/science of the mind; by now not only psychology but also a host of related disciplines are in the throes of a great intellectual revolution. And the epitome of the entire drama is Arti cial Intelligence, the exciting new e ort to make computers think. The fundamental goal of this research is not merely to mimic intelligence or produce some clever fake. Not at all. AI wants only the genuine article: machines with minds, in the full and literal sense. This is not science ction, but real science, based on a theoretical conception as deep as it is daring: namely, we are, at root, computers ourselves ( 37] , p. 2).
As many readers will remember, functionalist views taking the form of modal conditionals like (2 C ) have been the target of \arbitrary realization" arguments, which involve thought-experiments designed to show the logical possibility of an organism instantiating compu-causal state s but failing to have any mental states. 16 Searle's zombie scenarios could be understood as thought-experiments intended to play the same role as those at the core of arbitrary realization arguments: (2 )'s second conjunct would be a formalization of the sort of modal conditional cited above, and 3V2 1 would destroy this conjunct. 17 16 I have recently devised such thought-experiments to refute new, ingenious versions of machine functionalism explicitly designed to resist older, more primitive thoughtexperiments of the same general type. The purportedly inoculated brands of functionalism are speci ed by John Pollock 45] ; my gedanken-experiments can be found in \Chapter VI: Arbitrary Realization" of my What Robots Can and Can't Be 14]. The older thoughtexperiments are due to Ned Block 5] and, ironically enough, John Searle 53] . 17 After all, to say, as we have said on Dennett's behalf, that (2) can be read as \. . . there
This is not at all to say that V2 is, or can be distilled to, an arbitrary realization argument. In the tragic story of the poor soul in V2 who fades away when his brain is gradually replaced with silicon workalikes, there is nothing ridiculous: the workalikes are not tiny beer cans connected with string, for example. It's also important to distinguish the zombie in V2 from Swampman, 18 The Swampman has a more violent history than our zombie (and, as Bill Rapaport recently pointed out to me, history is thought by many to be crucial in these cases; cf. 41]), and it would be very di cult to esh out the Swampman case with neuroscienti c details (such eshing out becomes important later in the paper).
The second reason why the move under consideration on Dennett's behalf | reading (2) so that it makes no claim about an intimate connection between external behavior and internal mentality | is not available to him is that though many philosophers these days would resist the view that you can de ne the having of a type of mental state exhaustively in terms of external behavioral conditions, Dennett would not, given his well-known \intentional stance" theory. This is readily con rmed by looking to some of the relevant writings. For example, consider Dennett's Brainstorms 27] . When at the start of that book Dennett introduces his notion of an intentional system, and the intentional stance built upon it, he makes clear that he rejects machine functionalism of the sort set out in our (2 C ) (cf. 27], p. xvi). His version of this doctrine is laid out (on the same page) as follows. (4) 8x (x believes that snow is white x \realizes" some Turing machine k in logical state A)
is only some sort of conceptual or logical connection between conscious mental phenomena and external behavior : : :" conveniently overlooks the fact that the modal (2 ) is designed speci cally to capture the notion that the connection in question is, whatever its speci cs, conceptual/logical. 18 The Swampman was introduced by Donald Davidson: Suppose lightning strikes a dead tree in a swamp; I am standing nearby. My body is reduced to its elements, while entirely by coincidence (and out of di erent molecules) the tree is turned into my physical replica. My replica, The Swampman, moves exactly as I did; according to its nature it departs the swamp, encounters and seems to recognize my friends, and appears to return their greetings in English. It moves into my house and seems to write articles on radical interpretation. No one can tell the di erence. ( 17] , 441)
In Chapter 2 of Brainstorms Dennett gives his argument against (4), which is based on a thought-experiment featuring two di erent face-recognition systems, each designed by a di erent team of AI engineers. The crux is that while both systems are \well characterized as believing that p" ( 27] , p. 26; p ranges over such things as \I've seen this face before"), by hypothesis they realize di erent Turing Machines in di erent states. Proposition (4) is thus supposed to be overthrown by the time-honored scheme: there is some scenario wherein its antecedent is true while its consequent is false. Whether or not Dennett succeeds in refuting (4), given our purposes, is immaterial. What matters is that Dennett's attack has been mounted from his armchair; his blow against (4) comes from a thought-experiment. This implies that (4) is to be read as asserting a principled connection between belief and Turing Machine computation. This in turn implies that (4) is a modal conditional of some sort, a soulmate for our (2 C ). The equivalence in (4) is logical equivalence, not simply the material biconditional. For consider the following material biconditional. (5) 8x (x is an American politician $ x is corrupt) This proposition cannot be overthrown by armchair re ection. The cynic who a rms it will not be obliged to change his attitude upon hearing that a philosopher has cooked up a coherent story about a virtuous Senator. Dennett encapsulates his intentional stance via a conditional having precisely the form of (4), viz., (6) 8x (x believes that snow is white x can be predictively attributed the belief that snow is white) (p. xvii, 27]) And (6) cannot be a rmed while at the same time the connection between mentality and behavior is said | via the rebuttal we are considering on Dennett's behalf | to be a non-conceptual/non-logical one. 19 How else might Dennett try to dodge his dilemma? By carefully analyzing CE, and by ultimately asking Dennett himself, we can isolate and reject the remaining candidate responses:
Dennett's Objection From Method
Dennett might remind us that his complaint is about Searle's method. Well, true, Dennett strenuously objects in CE to Searle's emphasis on rst-person introspection, which he regards to be a benighted vestige of Cartesian folkpsychology. Dennett would supplant Searle's method with his own, a method called \heterophenomenology" | but the problem is, heterophenomenology is neutral on the possibility of zombies! Dennett is quite explicit about this:
W]hat about the zombie problem? Very simply, heterophenomenology by itself cannot distinguish between zombies and real, conscious people, and hence does not claim to solve the zombie problem or dismiss it. ( 26] , 95)
It may be worth pointing out that Dennett's complaint about method, when applied to RM's central thought-experiment, seems aimed at a straw man: Propositions (1){(3), as well as their formal counterparts (1 ){(3 ), are apparently third-personish. 20 And, surely Dennett can't be saying that Searle's view is that we can establish 3 , for any and all , only if can be conceived and \experienced" via the interior, \What-does-it-feel-like-tome-on-the-inside-?" rst-person point of view (since, e.g., Searle would hold, with us all, that it's logically possible that the Brooklyn Bridge turn instantly to jello, and would hold this in the absence of any phenomenological gymnastics).
Dennett's \Oops" Objection: Zombies vs. Zimboes
Faced with what our analysis has uncovered, Dennett might say that (oops) in his quoted reaction above he meant by the phrase \logically possible interpretation" not \account which describes a logical possibility," which is my reading, and surely the natural one, but something weaker like \candidate interpretation." This would be a rather desperate move. The problem with it, of course, is that not only is it (obviously!) logically possible that someone o er V2 1 , but V2 1 is itself logically possible. 21 After all, Searle could, at 20 Kieron O'Hara has pointed out to me that Mx is \available" only to the rst-person, hence my insertion of the quali er`apparently' in the preceding sentence. Nothing substantive hinges on the claim that (1)-(3) are third-personish. 21 As nearly all those who write on the zombie topic agree. See, for example, Dretske 28], Block 4] , Flanagan, 33] , and Harnad 35] .
the drop of a hat, provide a luxurious novel-length account of the scenario in question (or he could hire someone with the talents of a Kafka to do the job for him). 22 22 Despite having no such talents, I usually spend twenty minutes or so telling a relevant short story to students when I present zombies via V2. In this story, the doomed patient in V2 | Robert | rst experiences an unintended movement of his hand, which is interpreted by an onlooker at perfectly natural. After more bodily movements of this sort, an unwanted sentence comes out of Robert's mouth | and is interpreted by an interlocutor as communication from Robert. The story describes how this weird phenomenon intensi es : : : and nally approaches Searle's \late stage" description. 23 In his recent \The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies" 23] Dennett says the argument from CE which we are about to examine shows that zombies are not really conceivable.
24 Def 1's time index (which ought, by the way, to be a double time index | but that's something that needn't detain us here) is necessary; this is so in light of thoughtexperiments like the following. Suppose (here, as I ask you to suppose again below) that while reading Tolstoy's Anna Karenina you experience the state feeling for Levin's ambivalence toward Kitty. Denote this state by s ; and suppose that I have s at 3:05 pm Def 1 is said to be the higher-order theory (HOT) of consciousness. What sorts of examples conform to HOT? Dennett focuses on the state wanting to be fed. On Rosenthal's view, this state is a conscious state | and the reason it is is that it's the target of a higher-order thought, viz., the thought that I want to be fed. Rosenthal's Def 1, of course, leaves open the possibility that the higher-order thought can be itself unconscious.
How can Dennett be read as using Def 1 as a defense against the zombie attack (i.e. A 1 and A C 1 )? We can construct a counter-argument on Dennett's behalf which involves not only zombies, but also a variant that Dennett introduces to ward o zombies: zimboes. \A zimboe," Dennett says, \is a zombie that, as a result of self-monitoring, has internal (but unconscious) higher-order informational states that are about its other, lower-order informational states" ( 25] , 310). The corresponding argument is expressed by Dennett in rather desultory prose, but it can be charitably reconstructed from pages 310-311 of CE as a reductio aimed at Searle This argument is obviously formally valid (as can be seen by symbolizing it in the propositional calculus); premises (8) and (9) seem to me to be above reproach; (7) is an assumption for indirect proof; and (10) Here, again, the reasoning can be e ortlessly formalized (in propositional modal logic) and thereby shown to be valid. I grant (13), because Dennett's view that the judge in the Turing Test will unavoidably catalyze selfmonitoring via questions to contestants like \Why did you say, a few minutes back, that: : :" is quite plausible. This leaves proposition (16) and Def 1 itself as the only potentially vulnerable spots. But (16) is true because by de nition zimboes are not conscious. So we are left having to evaluate, in earnest, Def 1 | no small task, since this de nition is an account David Rosenthal has assembled, re ned, and defended over many years in a number of intelligent papers.
Readers inclined to a rm my zombie attack, and to sustain it in the face of Dennett's HOT-based objection, may think there is a short-cut that obviates having to grapple with HOT. Speci cally, the idea might be that Dennett begs the question: that A 2 +A 3 , and indeed any argument against 3V2 1 which has Def 1 for a premise, is a case of petitio principii.
This move, I concede, is at least initially promising. For it would seem that Def 1 automatically implies that zombies are impossible, because according to this de nition an unconscious state targeted at a lower-level state immediately implies (by modus ponens right-to-left across the biconditional) that the lower-level state is conscious. Isn't this circular? After all, the zombie thought-experiment is designed to reveal that it's perfectly conceivable that a behaviorally complex zombie (one that can pass itself o in human discourse as conscious, and therefore a fortiori one which can excel in the Turing Test 26 ) exist! Rosenthal's views are undeniably convenient for Dennett, but perhaps they are too convenient. One way to focus this complaint is perhaps to ask: Why should we accept (13)? The intuition behind this premise, after all, was the same as that behind and this proposition was to incarnate the intuition that we have only to make minor changes in the original zombie thought-experiment in order to have it portray zimboes. But now suddenly we nd that that which the original zombie thought-experiment is speci cally designed to exclude | namely, intention-bearing states | is surreptitiously stipulated to be inherent in the zimboe thought-experiment! Is Dennett's move like rejecting the claim that time travel is logically possible by taking as premise a view of space-time according to which time travel is impossible?
No. The charge of petitio fails, for two reasons. First, it con ates`intentional state' with`P-conscious state.' The original zombie gedankenexperiment (and the amended version designed to overthrow computationalism) insists that P-consciousness is absent; it doesn't insist that intentional states (which at least on HOT may or may not be P-conscious) are excluded. So the move against Dennett under consideration is like rejecting the claim that time travel is logically impossible by taking as premise a view of spacetime according to which time travel is possible. While most will agree that Dennett does not prove much by simply a rming Rosenthal's HOT, we must concede that neither does one prove anything by denying it. What is needed, then, is a direct attack on HOT itself | something I now provide.
A Direct Attack on Rosenthal's HOT
At rst glance, it seems that HOT is quickly killed o by taking note of everyday experiences in which one is in a conscious state that is not the target of any higher-order state. For example, consider the state, s , feeling for Levin's ambivalence toward Kitty, experienced while reading about these two characters as they move through Tolstoy's immortal Anna Karenina. Suppose that this state is experienced by you, as reader, while you are completely \transported" by the narrative. In such a case | so the story goes | there are no higher-order states directed at s . ] is conscious, there is something it's like for us to be in that state. When it's not conscious, we do not consciously experience any of its qualitative properties; so then there is nothing it's like for us to be in that state. How can we explain this di erence? : : : How can being in an intentional state, of whatever sort, result in there being something it's like for one to be in a conscious sensory state? ( 46] , pp. 24{25) My question exactly. And Rosenthal's answer? He tells us that there are \factors that help establish the correlation between having HOTs and there being something it's like for one to be in conscious sensory states" (p. 26, 46] ). These factors, Rosenthal tells us, can be seen in the case of wine tasting:
Learning new concepts for our experiences of the gustatory and olfactory properties of wines typically leads to our being conscious of more ne-grained di erences among the qualities of our sensory states : : : Somehow, the new concepts appear to generate new conscious sensory qualities. (p. 27, 46]) I confess I cannot help but regard Rosenthal's choice of wine tasting as tendentious. In wine tasting there is indeed a connection between HOTs and P-conscious states (the nature of which I don't pretend to grasp). But wine-tasting, as a source of P-consciousness, is unusually \intellectual," and Def 1 must cover all cases | including ones based on less cerebral activities. For example, consider fast downhill skiing. Someone who makes a rapid, \on-the-edge" run from peak to base will have enjoyed an explosion of Pconsciousness; such an explosion, after all, will probably be the main reason such an athlete buys expensive equipment and expensive tickets, and braves the cold. But expert downhill skiers, while hurtling down the mountain, surely don't analyze the ins and outs of pole plants on hardpack versus packed powder surfaces, and the ne distinctions between carving a turn at 20 mph versus 27 mph. Fast skiers ski; they plunge down, turn, jump, soar, all at incredible speeds. Now is it really the case, as Def 1 implies, that the myriad P-conscious states s 1 ; : : : ; s n generated in a screaming top-to-bottom run are the result of higher-level, noninferential, assertoric, occurrent beliefs on the part of a skier k that k is in s 1 , that k is in s 2 , k is in s 4 , : : :, k is in s n ? Wine tasters do indeed sit around and say such things as that, \Hmm, I believe this Chardonnay has a bit of a grassy taste, no?" But what racer, streaking over near-ice at 50 mph, ponders thus: \Hmm, with these new parabolic skis, 3 millimeters thinner at the wait, the sensation of this turn is like turning a corner in a ne vintage Porsche." And who would claim that such thinking results in that which it's like to plummet downhill? C F P Y J M B X S G R L HOT is threatened by phenomena generated not only at ski areas, but in the laboratory as well. I have in mind an argument arising from the phenomenon known as backward masking. Using a tachistoscope, psychologists are able to present subjects with a visual stimulus for periods of time on the order of milliseconds (one millisecond is 1/1000th of a second). If a subject is shown a 3 4 array of random letters (see the array above) for, say, 50 milliseconds (msecs), and is then asked to report the letters seen, accuracy of about 37% is the norm. In a set of very famous experiments conducted by Sperling 58] , it was discovered that recall could be dramatically increased if a tone sounded after the visual stimulus. Subjects were told that a high tone indicated they should report the top row, a middle tone the middle row, and a low tone the bottom row. After the table above was shown for 50 msec, to be followed by the high tone, recall was 76% for the top row; the same result was obtained for the other two rows. It follows that a remarkable full 76% of the array is available to subjects after it appears. However, if the original visual stimulus is followed immediately thereafter by another visual stimulus in the same location (e.g., circles where the letters in the array appeared; see the array below), recall is abysmal; the second visual stimulus is said to backward mask the rst. (See 2] for the seminal study.) Suppose, then, that a subject is ashed a series of visual patterns p i , each of which appears for only 5 msec. In such a case, while there is something it is like for the subject to see p i , it is very doubtful that this is because the subject thinks that she is in p i . In fact, most models of human cognition on the table today hold that information about p i never travels \far enough" to become even a potential object of any assertoric thought 1].
So, for these reasons, Def 1 looks to be massively implausible, and therefore the zombie attack has yet to be disarmed. 27 
Dennett's Objection from Racism
Dennett expresses this objection as follows: 27 Interestingly enough, Dennett himself doesn't take Rosenthal's de nition seriously. Nor, for that matter, does he feel, at this point in CE, any pressure to disarm the zombie attack:
If : : : Rosenthal's analysis of consciousness in terms of higher-order thoughts is rejected, then zombies can live on for another day's thought experiments. I o er this parable of the zimboes tongue in cheek, since I don't think either the concept of a zombie or the folk-psychological categories of higher-order thoughts can survive except as relics of a creed outworn. ( 26] , 313-14) Since I do indeed reject Rosenthal's HOT, zombies live on, by Dennett's own admission, in the thought-experiments with which we began our investigation.
Notice, by the way, that this equivocation between two senses of \epiphenomenal" also infects the discussion of zombies. `Zombie'] can be given a strong or weak interpretation, depending on how we treat : : : indistinguishability to observers. If we were to declare that in principle, a zombie is indistinguishable from a conscious person, then we would be saying that genuine consciousness is epiphenomenal in the ridiculous sense. That is just silly. So we could say instead that consciousness might be epiphenomenal in the sense that] although there was some way of distinguishing zombies from real people (who knows, maybe zombies have green brains), the di erence doesn't show up as a functional di erence to observers : : : On this hypothesis, we would be able in principle to distinguish the inhabited bodies from the uninhabited bodies by checking for brain color. This is also silly, of course, and dangerously silly, for it echoes the sort of utterly unmotivated prejudices that have denied full personhood to people on the basis of the color of their skin. It is time to recognize the idea of the possibility of zombies for what it is: not a serious philosophical idea but a preposterous and ignoble relic of ancient prejudices. ( 26] , I have elsewhere 12] discussed the penetrability of zombies, where, put roughly, the idea is that zombies are penetrated if they are unmasked as empty-headed, if, to use Harnad's 35] phrase, there is found to be \no-body home." Penetrability seems to essentially correspond to what Dennett here calls \distinguishability;" so let's unite his property and mine under the predicate`D:' for a zombie z, Dz i z is distinguished. In addition, let us invoke another predicate, O, which holds of a property G (we thus allow second-order constructs) just in case G is observed, and another property, F, which holds of a property if and only if that property \makes a functional di erence." Finally, let's take explicit note of the fact that when Dennett refers to green brains, he must have in mind any property that could serve to distinguish zombies from \real people" | so that we can refer to any distinguishing property . (No moderately intelligent defender of 3V2 1 thinks that in the key thought-experiments the color of the \brains" involved, or any other simple property like this, is in any way relevant.) With this simple machinery in hand, we can charitably set out Dennett's argument in the previous quote, and we can connect it to the zombie attack I'm promoting in this paper: 
17,18,21
A 4 is of course formally valid. As to soundness, what of premises (18), (19) , and (20)? The rst of these is quite plausible; in fact, if the modal operators are interpreted in line with the modal system S5 visited above, we may even be able to give a little sub-proof of (18) But now what about (20) ? This premise, I submit, is irreproachable, and who will contradict me? This leaves (19) | and here I think Dennett faces some rather rougher sledding. Why does he think this premise is true? Why does he think that a rming (23) 
entails an a rmation of racism? After all, isn't is somewhat implausible (not to mention harsh) to claim that those who a rm this formula are racists, or, in virtue of this a rmation, are at least willing to accept such prejudice? It's worth remembering, perhaps, that many of those who reject compucausal functionalism will a rm (23) . Are they thereby racist? I doubt it. It seems to me that everyone, Dennett included, must concede that racism, though perhaps aptly deemed a \cognitive sin," is usually understood to be a phenomenon a good deal less recherch e than embracing the formula in question! A rming (23) entails a certain attitude toward abstract properties in a thought-experiment; it does not entail a certain attitude toward actual beings. The quick way to grasp this is to simply change (23)'s quanti cation over zombies to (23 0 ) quanti cation over a victimized race or group, and to then inquire if (23 0 ) captures a racist attitude toward this group (it doesn't). The more rigorous route proceeds as follows.
First, note that (23)'s predicate O is ambiguous between \observed by a human" and \observed by an oracle (or a god : : :)." As we noted when a rming (18) , the second of these construals for O is the sort of thing we need to take seriously in our context. Let's use the subscripts h and o to disambiguate (23) into (23 h 
Now, Dennett's premise (17) must allow both of these in the disjunction forming its consequent. To quickly make this change, let us stipulate that O as it occurs in A 4 is a disjunctive property allowing for observation in either the O h or O o sense. It then becomes possible, I think, to show that (19) is false by devising a thought-experiment in which its antecedent is a rmed by those who are clearly not racists. 28 28 Though all this talk of oracles and gods may seem to be carrying us toward mysticism, there is actually an analogue for propositions of the form of (23 h ) and (23 o ) to be found in logic, speci cally in the area of undecidable problems: It is well-known that there is no Turing Machine which can decide whether or not a xed Turing Machine (or computer program, etc.) is ever going to halt. On the other hand, for every Turing Machine m, there is a fact of the matter as to whether or not m halts; m is either a halter or a non-halter (see 6] for elegant formal coverage of these matters). Now whereas it is generally thought to be impossible for a human to decide whether or not a Turing Machine halts (because, by computationalism itself, people don't have powers beyond Turing Machines), such is not the case for \oracles." Here, for example, is what we read in one of today's standard logicomathematical textbooks:
Once one gets used to the fact that there are explicit problems, such as the halting problem, that have no algorithmic solution, one is led to consider questions such as the following. Suppose we were given a \black box" or, as one says, an oracle, which somehow can tell us whether a given Turing machine with given input eventually halts. Then it is natural to consider a Suppose that there are people { Oraks { living on the Earth-like planet Orak who believe that rocks, plants, individual molecules, grains of sand, electrons (and other sub-atomic particles) are not P-conscious. Suppose, furthermore, that Oraks have all thought long and hard about whether the coordinated movement of such objects changes anything: about whether such moving objects are P-conscious. Their conclusion, to a person, is that Pconsciousness is still nowhere to be found. Let us imagine, in fact, that their conclusion stems from an a rmation of the arbitrary realization argument: they have considered scenarios in which, say, beer cans and string implement certain information-processing functions the Oraks have detected in their own brains, and have concluded that such contraptions would (obviously!, they say) lack P-consciousness. As to why Oraks themselves have P-consciousness, Oraks have a ready answer: the Oracle bestows a non-functional property upon their bodies, and this produces (or just is) P-consciousness. In fact, Oraks sometimes hear their Oracle speak: it thunderously says such things as, \Live!" | whereupon inert bodies glow for an instant and then move like those of healthy Oraks. Oraks, each and every one, a rm (23 o ). Each and every Orak also lives a saintly life: they are loving, caring, altruistic, eventempered, self-sacri cial, and so on. Finally, every now and then the Oraks come upon a creature that looks like them, but which never bore the evanescent tell-tale glow, and cannot point to a time when the Oracle performed (what the Oraks call) ensoulment. These beings (known as \zombaks") the Oraks lovingly treat as they treat all other Oraks, but they nonetheless never reject (23 o ).
This case seems perfectly coherent. 29 But then (19) is false, and A 4 fails.
kind of program that is allowed to ask questions of our oracle and to use the answers in its further computation. ( 18] , p. 197, emphasis his) More speci cally, if we reinterpret the predicate Dx as \decides whether or not x halts," and take the variable m to range over Turing Machines, the following two propositions are coherent and not implausible.
Out of extreme charity, we might at this point imagine someone saying: \Sure the Oraks might be ever so nice to zombaks; and what is morally reprehensible about racism derives from unequal treatment | so in that sense they aren't racists. But there is also something intellectually reprehensible about reliance on an oracle to make a distinction when there is no way to see that distinction for oneself or to understand the mechanism by which another device (be it an oracle or something arti cial) makes that distinction. We could quibble about whether or not it is appropriate to call this kind of intellectual defect \racism," but that would be to miss the point, I think, of Dennett's argument, which is that if you can't distinguish As from Bs except by pointing to features for which you have no explanation for the relevance of those features, then you are not being intellectually responsible."
This response only raises a red herring. The respondent admits that (19) is destroyed by my gedanken-experiment, so why does this new notion of \intellectual irresponsibility" matter? And why should Oraks be regarded intellectually irresponsible in the rst place? After all, the Oraks hear the Oracle speak (and, for that matter, might interact with it in many and varied ways)! We can be more precise about the issue: Let f be some interesting function, one that de es classi cation in our world as (computationally) solvable or unsolvable. (There are many such functions.) Assume that in our world, despite decades of e ort by rst-rate mathematical minds, f stands as a mystery. Now suppose that f and the history of failed attempts to crack it are present in a world w d in which both mere mortals (like ourselves) and a deity reside. Suppose, as well, that the mortal denizens of w d are quite passionate about distinguishing between solvable problems (= As) and unsolvable problems (= Bs). If the deity classi es f as an A (B), why is it intellectually irresponsible for the mortals to agree? Since (by hypothesis) f is well-de ned, either f 2 A or (exclusive) f 2 B; moreover, there must be some determinate mathematical reason why f is in the set it's in. Why is it intellectually irresponsible to believe that a god has grasped this reason? 30 I conclude that (19) is indeed shot down by the story of the Oraks. 33 ! 3 is a validity in (e.g.) S5. What the case does show, it seems to me, is that in order to have racism one needs to have, in addition to an a rmation of something like (23), a corresponding prescription for how to think about and treat zombies or zombaks. 30 We could of course go on to esh out the thought-experiment with additions like: The deity has in the past made many pronouncements on problems like f, and has in each case, after centuries of mortal e ort secures on answer, been proved correct. ), where this proposition is the result of changing the necessity operator in (2 C ) to one of physical necessity. 31 32 Besides, even those who suddenly decide to champion an idiosyncratic version of computationalism (according to which there is only a nomological connection between cognition and computation) will lose. This is because there would appear to be no reason why V2 1 and V2 TM 1 ought not to be regarded physically possible: Why couldn't a neuroscience-schooled Kafka write us a detailed, compelling account of V2 1 and V2 TM 1 , replete with wonderfully ne-grained revelations about brain surgery and \neurochips"? Then, to generate the physics counterpart to A 1 /A C 1 , we have only to change the modal operators to their physics correlates | 2 to 2 p and 3 to 3 p , perhaps | and then invoke, say, some very plausible semantic account of this formalism suitably parasitic on the standard semantic account of logical modes. 33 Note that the thought-experiment I have in mind, combined with such an account, does not merely establish that 33 p V2 TM 1 . Such a proposition says that there is a possible world at which V2 TM 1 is physically possible | which is veri ed by imagining a possible world w in a cluster of worlds w 1 ; : : : ; w n comprising those which preserve the laws of nature in w, where V2 TM 1 is true not only at w, but at least one w i . Let be the actual world; let W P 31 Proposition (2 0 ) would say that it's physically necessary that a brain's causing mental phenomena implies corresponding external behavior. 32 By the way, the retreat would have for Dennett the welcome e ect of trivializing Searle's pi ece de r esistance, for it implies that Searle's famous Chinese Room thoughtexperiment, designed to show that there is no logical/conceptual connection between symbol manipulation and mental phenomena, is trivial. Unfortunately, though Dennett isn't alone in wanting to dodge the Chinese Room, the view that the argument is trivial is an exceedingly solitary one. Note also that some have given versions of the Chinese Room designed from scratch to be physically possible. See, for example, \Chapter V: Searle," in 14]. 33 For a number of such accounts, see 30] .
denote the set of worlds preserving the laws of nature in . The story I imagine Kafka telling scrupulously stays within W P . Each and every inch of the thought-experiment is to be devised to preserve consistency with neuroscience and neurosurgery speci cally, and biology and physics generally. My approach here is no di erent than the approach taken to establish that more mundane states of a airs are physically possible. For example, consider a story designed to establish that brain transplantation is physically possible (and not merely that it's logically possible that it's physically possible). Such a story might x a protagonist whose spinal cord is deteriorating, and would proceed to include a step-by-step description of the surgery involved, each step described to avoid any inconsistency with neuroscience, neurosurgery, etc. It should be easy enough to convince someone, via such a story, that brain transplantation, at , is physically possible. (It is of course much easier to convince someone that it's logically possible that it's physically possible that Jones' brain is transplanted: one could start by imagining (say) a world whose physical laws allow for body parts to be removed, isolated, and then made contiguous, whereupon the healing and reconstitution happens automatically, in a matter of minutes.) Let me make it clear that I can easily do more than express my condence in Kafka: I can provide an argument for 3V2 TM 1 given that Kafka is suitably armed. There are two main components to this argument. The rst is a slight modi cation of a point made recently by David Chalmers 15] , namely, when some state of a airs seems, by all accounts, to be perfectly coherent, the burden of proof is on those who would resist the claim that is logically possible. 34 Speci cally, those who would resist need to expose some contradiction or incoherence in . I think most philosophers are inclined to agree with Chalmers here. But then the same principle would presumably hold with respect to physical possibility: that is, if by all accounts seems physically possible, then the burden of proof is on those who would resist 34 Chalmers gives the case of a mile-high unicycle, which certainly seems logically possible. The burden of proof would surely fall on the person claiming that such a thing is logically impossible. This may be the place to note that Chalmers considers it obvious that zombies are both logically and physically possible | though he doesn't think zombies are naturally possible. Though I disagree with this position, it would take us too far a eld to consider my objections. 35 So what I have in mind for V2 NN 1 is this: Kafka really knows his stu : he knows not only about natural neural nets, but also about arti cial ones, and he tells us the sad story of Smith | who has his neurons and dendrites gradually replaced with arti cial correlates in awless, painstaking fashion, so that information ow in the biological substrate is perfectly preserved in the arti cial substrate : : : and yet, as in V2 TM 1 , Smith's P-consciousness 35 A quick encapsulation, given that while many readers are familiar with Turing Machines, less will be acquainted with arti cial neural nets: Arti cial neural nets (or as they are often simply called,`neural nets') are composed of units or nodes designed to represent neurons, which are connected by links designed to represent dendrites, each of which has a numeric weight. It is usually assumed that some of the units work in symbiosis with the external environment; these units form the sets of input and output units. Each unit has a current activation level, which is its output, and can compute, based on its inputs and weights on those inputs, its activation level at the next moment in time. This computation is entirely local: a unit takes account of but its neighbors in the net. This local computation is calculated in two stages. First, the input function, in i , gives the weighted sum of the unit's input values, that is, the sum of the input activations multiplied by their weights:
In the second stage, the activation function, g, takes the input from the rst stage as argument and generates the output, or activation level, a i :
One common (and confessedly elementary) choice for the activation function (which usually governs all units in a given net) is the step function, which usually has a threshold t that sees to it that a 1 is output when the input is greater than t, and that 0 is output otherwise. This is supposed to be \brain-like" to some degree, given that 1 represents the ring of a pulse from a neuron through an axon, and 0 represents no ring. As you might imagine, there are many di erent kinds of neural nets. The main distinction is between feed-forward and recurrent nets. In feed-forward nets, as their name suggests, links move information in one direction, and there are no cycles; recurrent nets allow for cycling back, and can become rather complicated.
withers away to zero while observable behavior runs smoothly on. Now it certainly seems that 3 p V2 NN 1 ; and hence by the principle we isolated above with Chalmers' help, the onus is on those who would resist 3 p V2 NN 1 . This would seem to be a very heavy burden. What physical laws are violated in the new story of Smith?
Some may retort that if the \physics version" of the zombie attack is sound, then beings with our behavioral repertoire, but without P-consciousness, could in fact have evolved in the actual world, on this very planet, under the constraints imposed by our laws of nature. Why then, they may go on to say, aren't we zombies? This question has already been eloquently raised in a slightly di erent form by those who merrily endorse 3V2 1 33] . I think the question can be cashed out in an explicit argument against either the core notion of P-consciousness or the claim that 3V2 1 . The gist of the argument is this:
Look, evolution implies that every signi cant mental property corresponds to some concrete behavioral \payo ," something that has survival value. But P-consciousness, in light of the arguments you promote, Bringsjord, corresponds to no such payo . (The purported payo s from P-consciousness can all be explained via informationprocessing mechanisms involved in zombiehood; cf. 33].) Since evolution is of course true, it follows either that P-consciousness is a mirage, or :3V2 1 . There are at least two general ways to counter this argument. The rst is to remember that evolution does allow for outright accidents, and to then point out that P-consciousness could be adventitious. (As Ned Block has recently pointed out to me, since at least all mammals are probably Pconscious, the accident would had to have happened quite a while ago.) The second response, and the one I favor, is to step up to the challenge and show that certain behaviors do correspond to P-consciousness. I have elsewhere 11], 10] o ered sustained arguments for the position that creativity, for example the creativity shown by a great dramatist, involves P-consciousness. 36 36 Henrik Ibsen wrote:
I have to have the character in mind through and through, I must penetrate into the last wrinkle of his soul. I always proceed from the individual; the stage setting, the dramatic ensemble, all that comes naturally and does not
The second and nal move open to the computationalist still bent on resisting my zombie attack is one Dennett has made in personal communication: concede 3V2 1 , and concede my corresponding arguments, but issue a reminder that zombies are not a \serious possibility." 37 In this regard zombies are said to be like gremlins in the internal combustion engine: it's logically possible that those little sedulous creatures are what make your car run, but no one takes this possibility seriously. 38 Unfortunately, this is just to change the subject. It's true that no one needing to x an ailing Ford pops open the hood and reaches for bread crumbs to feed the gremlins; and it's also true that few indeed are those among us who wonder whether their friends are zombies. But such facts are perfectly consistent with each and every premise used above to refute the computational conception of mind. Besides, while the gremlin question promises to remain but an esoteric example dreamed up in an attempt to make a philosophical point, it is not hard to imagine a future in which the question of whether behaviorally sophisticated robots are or are not zombies is a pressing one.
cause me any worry, as soon as I am certain of the individual in every aspect of his humanity. (reported in 32], p. xiv) Ibsen's modus operandi is impossible for an agent incapable of P-consciousness. This is not to say that a zombie couldn't produce impressive text without using Ibsenian techniques. 37 There is a passage in CE consistent with this move. It is the last time Dennett discusses the zombie attack in his book:
This book argues] that if we are not urbane veri cationists, we will end up tolerating all sorts of nonsense: epiphenomenalism, zombies, indistinguishable inverted spectra, conscious teddy bears, self-conscious spiders. ( 26] , 459) The odd thing is that, as we have seen, Dennett nowhere in CE explains, let alone proves, that zombie thought-experiments, and the associated arguments, e.g., A 1 , are nonsensical. Moreover, these experiments and arguments are part of the canonical arsenal used against veri cationism! 38 Dennett claims that in light of this, zombies have become a public relations nightmare for philosophers, for when scientists hear that a major philosophical controversy boils down to zombies, they wear silly grins. But shouldn't we be concerned with constructing sound arguments and discarding unsound ones, regardless of how people feel about these arguments?
Conclusion
Where does this leave us? Well, if computationalism is true, then (2 C ), essentially the claim that appropriate computation su ces for P-consciousness, is as well. If argument A C 1 is sound, (2 C ) falls, as does, by modus tollens, computationalism itself. A 
